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Abstract 
This paper analyses the motivation behind the UN decision to establish the 
LDC category in 1971. The reviewed literature highlights conflicting interests 
of the actors involved. It provides a historical account of the creation of the 
category and an international political economy analysis of that process. Based 
on this literature, I argue that the initial LDC identification process - which set 
a precedent for future LDC categorizations - was manipulated in order to 
generate a reduced list of small and economically and politically insignificant 
countries. Contrary to the LDC official narrative, this list served the interests 
of both donors (by undermining UN’s implicit effort to normalize 
international assistance) and other non-LDC developing countries (disturbed 
by the creation of a positive discrimination within the group, favouring the 
most disadvantaged among them). As a result of this manipulation, 
considerably less development-promoting efforts are demanded from donors; 
which, in turn, does not significantly distress the interests of other non-LDC, 
more advanced developing countries. 
Keywords 
LDCs, aid, trade, special and preferential treatment, graduation, UN 
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Aiming high, falling short1 
the Least Developed Country (LDC) category at 40 
1 Introduction 
In May 2011 the international community, under the auspices of the UN, 
gathered for the fourth time in 40 years to assess progresses made by the least 
developed country (LDC) group. The conference took place in Istanbul, under 
the grim shadow of a stagnant and non-evolving category, whose membership 
has not declined for most of its lifespan. The main goal was “(a) to reverse the 
marginalization of LDCs ...; (b) to support a pattern of accelerated and 
sustained economic growth … and (c) to help LDCs graduate from LDC 
status” (UNCTAD, 2010: 83). To achieve this, the 2011 Istanbul Programme 
of Action was adopted (UN 2011). Like other main LDC literature 
(UNCTAD’s LDC Reports over the years 1984 - 2010, UN 2001, UNCDP 
2008 and Guillaumont 2009), the Programme’s focus on goodwill and 
technicalities impedes it from questioning and problematising the category’s 
assumptions2. The Istanbul outcome document fails to address political 
economy issues3 and, hence, cannot represent a true overhaul effort. It does 
not consider the distribution of power between the main actors involved 
(donors, LDCs and more advanced developing countries), nor the possible 
costs and benefits borne by them4 as a result of their commitment to the LDC 
mechanism. 
The official narrative is that, through the LDC category, donors should 
provide these countries with special benefits, given their disadvantaged 
position in the world economy (UNCDP, 2008: v). This to ensure catching up 
and, as a result, a more levelled playing field in the arena where countries 
                                                 
1 Preliminary versions were presented at the Development Dialogue Conference, hosted by 
the ISS, in the Hague (June 2011), at the Conference on Development Economics and Policy, 
hosted by the KfW Development Bank and the German Institute for Economic 
Research, in Berlin (June 2011), and at the 2011 CERES Summer School, in Utrecht 
(July 2011). Comments by participants are gratefully acknowledged. 
Acknowledgement is also due to Peter van Bergeijk, Karel Jansen and Susan Newman 
for detailed comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this paper. 
2 The belief that it actually groups the most in need and the conviction that donors are 
exclusively moved by altruism. 
3 Such as the extent to which politics, as well as economic and strategic interests, can 
influence and motivate the allocation of aid and trade preferences. For example, when 
the main drive for the allocation of these development support measures is not 
countries’ needs but the fulfilment of donor’s political and economic agendas, it is 
expectable that the poorest countries - and, hence, the most ‘deserving’ - are not 
necessarily the ones that receive more development support, irrespectively of any 
international instrument (such the LDC category) created to contradict that. 
4 For example, donors driven primarily by self-serving motivations (e.g., advancement 
of one’s own interests before considering the needs of others), will not be interested 
to support a developing country with the potential of becoming a direct competitor. 
Likewise, a more advanced developing country not pertaining to the LDC category 
will not appreciate to see its direct competitors contemplated by this support 
mechanism. 
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engage one another. Thus, a declining number of LDCs is the ultimate aim of 
the category. This has not been achieved. Today, 40 years after the 
establishment of the category, only three countries have graduated out of it5; 
representing a disappointing 6% success rate. 
TABLE 1 
 List of LDCs and PPP converted GDP per capita, at 2005 constant prices  
– in US dollars (1971 and 2009) 
Africa 1971 2009 Asia and 
the Pacific 
1971 2009 Latin America 
and the 
Caribbean 
1971 2009 
Angola 2539.40 4753.53 Afghanistan 878.06 1169.71 Haiti 1697.52 1444.55 
Benin 884.47 1115.71 Bangladesh 761.31 1397.05    
Burkina Faso 523.40 902.44 Bhutan* 828.37 4565.96    
Burundi 353.14 368.06 Cambodia 1041.54 1766.12    
Central African 
Republic 
1010.26 647.71 Kiribati 2684.43 4092.16    
Chad 897.54 1276.40 Lao 
People’s 
Democratic 
Rep. 
650.73 2633.38    
Comoros 1250.41 915.71 Myanmar N/A N/A    
Democratic 
Rep. of the 
Congo 
1117.75 231.28 Nepal 665.77 1211.48    
Djibouti 5252.13 2060.86 Samoa* 4535.68 6545.37    
Equatorial 
Guinea 
716.18 22016.8
4 
Solomon 
Islands 
1375.89 2004.60    
Eritrea N/A 592.48 Timor-Leste N/A 1154.61    
Ethiopia 471.31 683.66 Tuvalu N/A N/A    
Gambia 808.37 1464.76 Vanuatu 3059.17 6534.92    
Guinea 827.86 826.33 Yemen N/A 2396.96    
Guinea-Bissau 289.47 818.38       
Lesotho 475.54 1311.47       
Liberia 1919.14 396.90       
Madagascar 897.60 753.22       
Malawi 755.18 653.04       
Mali 471.86 999.38       
Mauritania 1276.16 1573.77       
Mozambique 432.64 759.48       
Niger 813.58 534.34       
Rwanda 785.26 1031.09       
São Tomé and 
Príncipe 
1159.39 1679.86       
Senegal 1232.65 1492.04       
Sierra Leone 966.10 872.68       
Somalia 929.86 460.89       
Sudan 1465.17 2188.44       
Togo 1308.04 734.20       
Uganda 805.75 1151.75       
United Rep.  
of Tanzania 
624.43 1188.89       
Zambia 2380.93 1764.72       
Source: Alan Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, Penn World Table Version 7.0, Centre for International Comparisons  
of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania, May 2011, 
http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt70/pwt70_form.php 
Original / 1971 LDCs are in bold. *In 1971 data was not available for these countries, but they were still in the original  
LDC group because the unavailability of statistical data was considered proof of their low level of development. 
                                                 
5 Botswana (1994), Cape Verde (2008) and Maldives (2011). 
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This paper provides a historical account of the creation of the LDC 
category, investigating what drove its creation in 1971. The analysis addresses 
other interrelated sub-questions, namely: Why were the thresholds set up at 
those levels? Were the criteria purposely chosen so as to exclude or include 
certain countries?6 What informed these decisions? Which countries were 
(intentionally or not) left out or included because of these criteria? Which 
actors (LDCs, other non-LDC developing countries and donors) benefitted 
from the establishment of the category? 
The group is still composed of 48 countries, spanning three regions (see 
Table 1), with Africa assuming the lead: 33 out of 48 LDCs are African 
countries; representing 68.7%. From the initial 25 LDCs identified in 1971, the 
category grew to a total of 51 countries7 and membership fell to 48, following 
the three graduation cases to date. 
 
Map of current 48 LDCs (source: www.wikipedia.org). Red dots indicate countries that graduated from 
LDC status; from left to right: Cape Verde (2008), Botswana (1994) and Maldives (2011) 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: section 1.1 frames the 
inquiry by briefly reviewing world economic and political context, as well as 
main theoretical approaches and analytical models informing mainstream 
development paradigm at the time, ultimately influencing policy-makers; 
section 1.2 presents facts and protagonists of the process that culminated with 
the creation of the LDC category in 1971; section 1.3 investigates responses to 
the establishment of this new category and section 2 concludes and presents 
possible avenues for further research. 
                                                 
6 For example, the share of manufacturing can be said to bias towards smaller 
countries, as does the vulnerability criterion introduced later on, in 1991. 
7 This happened as more countries became independent in the 70s and the poor 
performance of other developing countries made them join the group in the 80s and 
90s. 
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2   The establishment of  the LDC category: historical 
perspective 
2.1 World context, theoretical approaches and analytical 
models (1960s and 1970s) 
In the development literature, modernization theory was one of the first and most 
influential theories employed in Third World studies, analyzing progress mainly 
in terms of economic transition from tradition to modernity (Berger 1994, 
Brohman 1995, Kamrava 1995, Ma 1998). According to this theory, the 
concept of development (in a world composed of two categories of countries: 
‘developed’ and ‘developing’) is very much associated with “the construction of 
a single model of modernity based on the experience of a few (industrialized) 
countries” (Brohman, 1995: 122). This approach (which during the post-war 
period was hegemonic at the popular and academic levels and, most 
importantly, greatly influenced policy ideas) imposed an idealized version of 
North America and Western Europe on Latin America, the Middle East, 
Africa, Asia and Oceania (Berger, 1994: 260); regions generally referred to as 
the ‘Third World’. In other words, “the entire edifice of post-war 
modernisation theory rested on a homogeneous image of the ‘Third World’ 
destined to follow the North American and Western European path” (Berger, 
1994: 260). 
Another alternative development framework of the 1960s and 1970s - the 
world-system theory - made use of a different dichotomist pair; that of core and 
periphery, intermediated by the notion of semi-periphery, stimulated by the 
same fundamental thinking influencing the dependency debate (Payne, 2001: 
7). However, this approach postulates that “a particular country’s internal 
development [can] only be ‘understood’ with reference to the position it 
occupies, or the role it plays, in the modern world-system as a whole” (Berger, 
1994: 263). Hence, inequality in terms of power and availability of resources is 
a central feature. In essence, this approach considers that economic and 
political relations are the main determinants of countries’ position in the world 
order. 
Despite the surfacing and diffusion of alternative approaches to 
development, modernization theory maintained its vitality, greatly influencing 
academics and policymakers. The UN, on its part was to a great extent 
financially and ideologically supported by the United States in an era when this 
great power’s concern was to avoid the advance of communist ideas 
(Schlesinger 1997). 
During the 1960s and 1970s - period of initial debate on the LDC concept 
– an important change was taking place within UN membership: increase in 
number and voice of Third World countries and, consequently, call for a New  
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International Economic Order8. Before this, developing countries were 
powerless colonies. In this period they gained independence and were more in 
control of their development. They also gained majority of votes in the UN, 
which meant that hegemonic powers had a harder time dealing with an 
organization where they no longer controlled the majority. It was a period of 
optimism, where newly independent countries successfully strived for 
development (e.g., economic growth was quite positive, even in most of sub-
Saharan Africa), oftentimes supported by the conviction that rich countries 
owed them for the long period of colonial repression. 
It was also during this period that (i) the UN proclaimed the First and 
Second Development Decades (1961 and 1971, respectively), convened the 
first UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (1964), created 
UNDP (1965) and the UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) 
(1967) and adopted the Declaration on the Establishment of a New 
International Economic Order (1974); and (ii) the World Bank created the 
International Development Association (1960), the IMF established its 
compensatory financing facility (1963), Part IV of the GATT was integrated 
into this General Agreement (1965) (paving the way for the generalized system 
of preferences) and the joint IMF-World Bank Development Committee was 
established (1974) (Thérien, 2002: 239). These initiatives were framed 
according to the understanding that economic growth and development 
obeyed a rather mechanical and straightforward process, anchored in the 
conviction that foreign aid to poorer countries was sure to bear fruit. 
What is clear is that central to all the aforementioned theories and 
conceptual approaches was the notion of the Third World, “as a set of national 
economies or as a subject in economics” (Wolf-Phillips, 1987: 1318). Given the 
geopolitical context within which the Third World concept flourished - that of 
the Cold War -, it quickly fit within the idea of a First (or capitalist West) and 
Second (or communist/socialist East) Worlds. All of these were concepts 
deeply infused in political connotations, even though they were inspired by a 
point of departure that also implied economic and social challenges. As a 
result, those in the Third World were (in addition to their higher level of 
poverty) considered to assume a middle-of-the-road political position between 
the two major contending ideologies of that period: capitalism/NATO and 
communism/Warsaw Pact. Third World countries became, in effect, the ‘non-
aligned countries’ - which placed politics in the forefront of that particular way 
of categorizing countries. 
According to Wolf-Phillips (1987), the term Fourth World - or the ‘Third 
World of the Third World’, as some have referred to it (UNCTAD 1985) - was 
only introduced at a later stage (during the 1980s) “to denote the least developed 
and chronically poor countries” (Wolf-Phillips, 1987: 1313, emphasis added). It 
seems that the reference to chronic poverty, to differentiate these countries 
                                                 
8 NIEO was a set of demands presented by Third World countries in 1974. It 
envisaged restructuring the international economic system to improve the position of 
developing countries with respect to developed countries. The demands included 
increased control by developing countries over their own resources, promotion of 
industrialization, increase of development assistance and debt relief 
(http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1O48-NewInternationalEconmcrdr.html). 
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from other more well-off countries in the Third World, is a clear indication 
that little upward development movement was expected of them. In fact, with 
the benefit of hindsight we can see that this perspective is mirrored in the 
considerations of the UN Committee for Development Policy (UNCDP), 
which did not until 1991 (i.e., 20 years after the creation of the LDC category) 
consider the possibility of countries graduating from ‘least developed’ status. In 
essence, the least developed could be ‘trapped’ in underdevelopment, 
“hopelessly reflecting the notion of an underdevelopment ‘trap’ (Guillaumont, 
2009: 30). In addition, conceding that these were “poor countries more likely 
to remain so” (Guillaumont, 2009: 9), also denotes an idea of hopeless poverty. 
Figure 1 depicts how the economic and political world order was 
analytically structured and understood during the Cold War period and before 
the fall of communism in 1989. Generally speaking, this was the analytical 
understanding of the world that informed, or at least greatly contributed to, the 
UN decision to officially establish the LDC category, in 1971. In fact, at the 
time, UNCDP (the body that recommended the establishment of the LDC 
category and proposed the initial list of such countries) explicitly distinguished 
in its reports between ‘developed market economies’, ‘centrally planned 
economies’ and ‘developing countries’ (UNCDP, 1970: 20-21), with the 
understanding that the latter was its only realm of intervention within the three 
worlds framework in which it operated 
FIGURE 1 
 Analytical understanding of world order during Cold War period 
 
Despite a supposedly new understanding of Africa’s problems (due to 
newly independent African countries joining the UN in the 60s and 70s), 
“much of the professional work in the UN continued to revolve around the 
threefold classification of developed market, socialist centrally planned, and 
developing countries” (Jolly et. al 2004: 160). 
Jolly et.al (2004) consider that the tendency to make policies based on this 
threefold, homogenized classification was actually reinforced in 1964 with the 
establishment of the Group of 77 (G77) during the first United Nations 
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Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), adding that even though 
the G77 tried “to incorporate the concerns and priorities of all … its proposals 
on trade, foreign investment, transnational corporations, and transfer of 
technology … were inevitably of greater interest to the more advanced among 
the developing countries” (Jolly et. al, 2004: 160). Hence, even within the G77 
framework, the least advanced were still being marginalized. 
Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that, while the three worlds 
classification served as the analytical model on which the idea to compartmentalize the Third 
World rested (specifically by highlighting the least developed subset within it), 
the premises defended by the modernization theory seem to have influenced the type of benefits 
attached to the LDC category, namely the emphasis on trade and the idea that aid 
should fuel industrialization. This is reflected, for example, in the initial LDC 
identification criteria, which gave more weight to economic factors, particularly 
per capita GDP and share of manufacturing in GDP. Accepting this analytical 
and conceptual model also meant accepting the logic of Third World 
homogeneity. This was, in fact, an often-voiced criticism of this specific way of 
country categorization and worldview. 
In the years that preceded the decision to create the LDC category, the 
idea of a homogeneous Third World - understood as the failed version of the 
ideal industrialized First World - was very much present. This was the image 
that provided the most powerful set of assumptions about the poorest part of 
the world, believed to be in need of (industrialization-focused) development 
intervention. Third World economic problems were “understood primarily as 
technical problems that [could] be overcome by the right mix of advice, 
investment, aid and liberal reform” (Berger, 1994: 270 - see also Ferguson 
1990, 1994, Escobar 1998, Payne 2001, 2005); which was related to the 
homogeneity assumption and the straightforward/mechanical vision on 
economics and development. 
The underlying principle of the LDC category seems to fit into this line of 
reasoning, even though it represented somewhat of a step beyond the 
simplistic First/Third World dichotomy, since, to some extent, it did de-
homogenized the Third World by creating a subgroup within it. In addition, it 
also recognized (mostly in its narrative) some of the salient processes that 
perpetuate uneven development. Yet, other ‘worlds’ were left ‘untouched’; 
indicating that the prevailing international order remained essentially intact. 
Basically, this meant that the status quo was undisturbed, as was the global 
balance of power. Therefore, establishing the LDC category did not 
significantly upset the interests of neither the developed world nor more 
advanced developing countries. Donors, in particular, by endorsing a narrative 
showcasing the altruistic prioritization of assistance to LDCs (without a legally-
binding obligation to actually implement it; as reflected by the low number of 
graduations to date), simply appeased voices against the status quo (without 
having to meaningfully change it and relinquish power). 
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2.2 ‘Constructing’ a new category of (poor) countries: facts 
and protagonists (1964 - 1971) 
International debate around trade preferences9 served as the springboard to the 
idea to clarify the list of developing countries and, within this general list, 
identify a new sub-category, grouping ‘least developed’ countries (see Table 2). 
Officially, the issue was first brought up in 1964, during the first UNCTAD, 
where 
la nécessité de mettre sur pied, …, le nouveau système des préférences 
généralisées pour les exportations de produits manufactures et semi-factures des 
pays pauvres sur le marché des pays développés …exigeait une décision précise 
quant aux bénéficiaires (de Lacharrière, 1971 : 464). 
This indicates an important point: the initiative was not taken merely in 
recognition of poorest countries’ disadvantages towards development and, 
hence, the need to provide them with additional assistance, but, primarily, to 
facilitate trade with developed countries. To an important extent, development 
was equated to the promotion of international trade (through industrialization). 
Against this ideological backdrop, the 1960s had been proclaimed the First UN 
Development Decade and international dialogue on development gained particular 
impetus within UNCTAD (Guillaumont, 2009: 19).  
Even before the first session of UNCTAD, in February 1964, the 
possibility of differentiating within the larger developing countries group 
(highlighting the least developed within it; to whom preferential treatment 
ought to be granted) was considered during meetings of the GATT’s Working 
Party on Preferences: 
Although ... there was no change in the position of the United States and the 
European Economic Community, the meeting was called primarily to consider a 
statement presented by Uganda … and also … at the request of developing 
countries who wished to make a demonstration of their solidarity in order to 
erase the impression of disarray given at the meeting last December [1963]. … 
Uganda suggested differential and two-tiered preferences designed so that the least-developed of 
the less-developed10 countries would receive the greatest preferences. … This proposal would run 
counter to the proposals made by India, Brazil, United Arab Republic and other less-developed 
countries. The preferences would be given only to GATT members although there 
would be no requirement that they would be limited to these members (Fagen, 
1964: 1, emphasis added). 
By June 1964, during the first UNCTAD, countries were organized into three 
negotiating groups, respecting, as would be expected, the Three Worlds 
taxonomy prevalent in that period: (i) industrialized countries with a market 
economy (i.e., First World), (ii) countries with planned economies (i.e., Second  
                                                 
9 The Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) is a formal system of exemption from 
the more general rules of the WTO which obligates WTO members to treat the 
imports of other WTO members no worse than they treat the imports of their “most 
favored” trading partner; that is, to treat imports from all other WTO members 
equally by imposing equal tariffs on them 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Generalized_System_of_Preferences). 
10 Within the UN, the terms less-developed and developing were used interchangeably 
at the time. 
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TABLE 2 
 The birth of the LDC category: a chronological tale of selected facts 
1964 
1st UNCTAD (June, Geneva) - in the context of trade 
preferences, possibility of favouring the least developed among 
developing countries is discussed. 
1965 
UNCTAD - Raúl Prebisch takes office as Executive Secretary and 
the LDC issue gains impetus. 
1967 
2nd session of UNCDP (April, Santiago de Chile) - in the 
framework of preparatory work for the Second UN Decade, the 
issue of special measures to promote greater economic growth in 
developing countries is considered. 
G77 First Ministerial Conference (October, Algiers) - final 
declaration includes section on least developed countries but 
refuses to clearly define them. 
1968 
2nd UNCTAD (May, New Delhi) - adopts resolution on the least 
developed countries. 
UN General Assembly (December, New York) - adopts resolution 
urging UNCTAD to pay special attention to least developed countries. 
1969 
5th session of UNCDP (May, Bangkok) - recognizes need to refine 
twofold classification of countries in the context of international trade 
and financial policies. 
UN General Assembly (December, New York) - adopts resolution on 
“Special measures to be taken in favour of the least developed ... countries” 
1970 
6th session of UNCDP (January, New York) - term ‘least developed’ 
used for the first time in report to the ECOSOC. 
UNCDP (March, Geneva) - meeting of working group on least 
developed countries 
UN General Assembly (October, New York) - proclaims Second UN 
Development Decade and adopts International Development Strategy for 
the Decade, including section on least developed countries. 
UN General Assembly (December, New York) - adopts resolution 
urging identification of least developed countries. 
1971 
7th session of UNCDP (March/April, Geneva) - recommends criteria 
for identifying least developed countries, special measures in their 
favour and suggests an initial group of 25 LDCs. 
ECOSOC (July, New York) - recommends to the General Assembly 
the list of 25 LDCs proposed by UNCDP. 
UN General Assembly (November, New York) - adopts resolution on 
“Identification of the least developed among the developing countries”, approving 
list of “hard core” LDCs, as proposed by UNCDP. 
Source: Author´s compilation based on UNCDP reports and General Assembly and  
ECOSOC resolutions 
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World), and (ii) developing countries (i.e., Third World). Developing countries 
constituted the G77, congregating newly independent countries and others 
non-aligned with either of the two Cold War contending powers. 
To clearly determine the group of countries that could benefit from trade 
preferences, UNCTAD opted for the principle of self-election (de Lacharrière, 
1971: 464); meaning, basically, that countries would be categorized as 
‘developing’ (and hence benefit from the Generalized System of Preferences - 
GSP) if they classified themselves as such. At the time, the G77 “refused any 
discrimination among themselves” (Guillaumont, 2009: 20). In fact, this 
reluctance to ‘divide’ developing countries had been felt during the February 
1964 meeting of the GATT’s Working Party on Preferences: 
The meeting was dominated by the less-developed countries which stood 
together and did not allow themselves to be drawn into discussions of the 
differences among them. In fact, Uganda did not even speak in defense of its 
paper [which argued for greater preferences to the least-developed of the less-
developed countries] (Fagen, 1964: 1). 
In this context, it is interesting to note the underlying political interest of 
developed countries in seeing this reform through. For example, according to 
de Lacharrière (1971), France perceived very clearly that if the reform only 
resulted in the creation of a single undifferentiated category of developing 
countries, African countries with which she had the closest ties were likely to 
be harmed by a reform that would only benefit the most powerful within the 
Third World (de Lacharrière, 1971: 468). In fact, France was more aggressive 
than developing countries themselves in exposing these risks (de Lacharrière, 
1971: 468). However, at the end of UNCTAD’s first session there was no 
agreement about creating a sub-category of least developed countries within 
the developing countries group. 
In 1965 the issue gained impetus, when Argentinean economist and 
dependency theory advocate Raúl Prebisch - who had headed the UN 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) - took 
office as UNCTAD’s first Executive Secretary. Prebisch was well aware of the 
reality of the Latin American Free Trade Association - all of whose members 
were, by definition, developing countries and where two sub-categories of 
countries had been created: (i) countries with relatively lower economic 
development and (ii) countries with particularly small domestic market (de 
Lacharrière, 1971: 469). Hence, this perspective was brought into a wider, 
global context. 
By 1967, preparatory work aiming at establishing guidelines and proposals 
for the Second UN Development Decade (1970s) served as the background for the 
decision to operationalise the LDC concept. Building on UNCTAD’s first 
session and following general recognition that economic progress during the 
First Development Decade had been “disappointingly slow” (UN, 1967: 42), 
UNCDP was mandated, by the ECOSOC and the General Assembly, to work 
on the aforementioned guidelines and propose a new international 
development strategy for the 1970s. Accordingly, in its 2nd session, in April 
1967, UNCDP (presided by Dutch economist and Nobel Prize winner Jan 
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Tinbergen11), considered “imperative for all the organizations of the United 
Nations family to redouble their efforts and to work out a series of new 
measures” (UNCDP, 1967: 27) to be included in the international development 
strategy for the 1970s. 
In October 1967, least developed countries earned a special (but quite 
general) mention in the final declaration of the First Ministerial Conference of 
the G77 (the Charter of Algiers), regarding international measures to be 
implemented in their favour, including (rather vague) provisions on trade 
preferences and development finance. The G77 discomfort regarding this issue 
is reflected in the Charter of Algiers, which states that it was not “desirable or 
convenient to attempt an abstract general definition of such countries nor … 
an a priori strict listing of such countries applicable to specific measures 
considered” (Group of 77, 1967). 
In February 1968, an UNCTAD report proposed possible indicators for 
the identification of LDCs, namely: (i) proportion of GDP originating in the 
manufacturing sector; (ii) per capita energy, cement or steel consumption level; 
(iii) literacy level or number of doctors or of university or technical school 
graduates; (iv) proportion of manufactures in total export (UNCTAD, 1968: 9-
10). In terms of methodology, the report stated: 
A practical approach to the classification problem might consist in first ranking 
all those for which data are available according to the level of their per capita 
GDP. Countries falling below a certain chosen cut-off level of per capita GDP 
would then be regarded prima facie as being candidates for the least developed 
category, an assumption to be confirmed or refuted by reference to other 
development indicators. A process of elimination could then be applied to this 
preliminary set of least developed candidates. How far this elimination process 
went would depend on how restrictive the definition of least developed countries 
was to be. The most restrictive approach would recognize as least developed 
countries only those qualifying as such on the basis of all the chosen 
development indicators. The least restrictive would include in this category all 
countries qualifying on the basis of per capita GDP plus any one additional 
indicator of development (UNCTAD, 1968: 11, underlined as in original). 
During its second session, in May 1968, UNCTAD approved the principle of 
self-election for determining the larger developing countries’ group, and 
unanimously adopted the first resolution12 calling attention to the problems of 
the least developed (UN, 1973: 60); which was, nonetheless, still drafted in 
rather general and noncommittal terms. Yet, even though it signalled a not very 
determined political will, this resolution had the effect of starting a 
bureaucratic process that, in parallel with the diplomatic debate, allowed 
further analysis of both the LDC concept and the special measures envisaged 
for these countries (Smouts, 1981: 51 and UN 1973). 
As a result of the approval of the self-election principle, all G77 countries 
declared themselves ‘developing’ and consequently entitled, in principle13, to 
                                                 
11 Tinbergen presided over the work of the UN Committee for Development 
Planning from 1966 until 1971, and subsequently continued working with the 
Committee as one its consultants. 
12 Resolution 24 (II) 
13 But not necessarily in practice. 
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the GSP. What is interesting is that others not pertaining to the Third World 
also declared themselves ‘developing countries’; among them socialist and 
poorer European countries - Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, Spain, Portugal, 
Turkey, Israel and Taiwan (de Lacharrière, 1971: 465). Hence, at least in this 
specific context, the dividing lines between the three worlds were starting to 
lose definition, primarily due to commercial interests; leading to the conclusion 
that, as evidenced here, countries will self-declare to a not so positive label if 
they find it beneficial14. 
Following this, in December 1968, the General Assembly adopted 
another resolution15, urging UNCTAD to pay special attention to the least 
developed countries. 
2.2.1 A change in perspective … and a new category is born 
During its 5th session, in May 1969, UNCDP explicitly recognized that in the 
context of international trade and financial policies, there needed to be a 
rfinement of the “twofold classification of countries as developed and 
developing” (UNCDP, 1969: 13). It stated that: 
In such measures as granting of preferences by developed countries to 
developing economies and providing them with financial resources, it seems 
inappropriate to have a sharp demarcation line between the two country groups. For … it 
would mean that at a point of time in the future a country would be considered 
to have shifted suddenly from the developing to the developed country group, 
and as such would experience a set-back by virtue of the new obligations it was 
suddenly asked to assume in place of the assistance previously received. It seems 
more natural to introduce an intermediate group … which would not have to undertake 
obligations towards developing countries but at the same time would no longer, 
as a rule, receive assistance or preference (UNCDP, 1969: 13, emphasis added). 
Prefacing this, UNCDP - probably sensing the boldness of its proposal - 
was careful enough to recognize that some of its suggestions “may appear 
somewhat abrupt” (UNCDP, 1969: 3). However, it explained that it had 
chosen “to present certain provocative formulations” (UNCDP, 1969: 3) 
                                                 
14 There is, therefore, a clear difference between the process to identify developing 
countries (through self-election) and the process to identify LDCs (through clearly 
defined criteria managed by a gatekeeper). At the time, also in the context of the 
GATT, “[d]eveloping country status was (and remains) determined by self-declaration 
- the only formal group of developing countries defined in Part IV and the Enabling 
Clause are the LDCs” (Hoekman and Özden, 2005: 6). This is basically the difference 
between choosing a label and earning/meriting a label. Apparently, the LDC category 
is more exclusive and, as a result, entry into it is more selective. This indicates that, 
from the donors’ perspective, there are interests at stake when categorizing countries, 
which cannot be overlooked in the name of altruism. This demands cost management 
considerations in so far as pertaining to these groups entails granting them access, at 
least in principle, to a set of differentiated benefits. Thus, in principle, LDCs are 
entitled to more advantageous benefits than other developing countries. However, 
these are not automatic processes and whether or not these benefits are actually 
provided depends on donors’ goodwill, which makes this type of preferential 
treatment non-legally binding. 
15 Resolution 2402 (XXIII) 
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because the data on which it had based its recommendations had “convinced it 
of the necessity and the urgency of certain radical changes in the prevailing 
policies” (UNCDP, 1969: 3). Although at the time, it had not been explicitly 
spelled out, the soon-to-be-named ‘LDC category’ seemed to fit quite nicely 
within that context, even though the argumentation initially presented led to 
believe that redefining the twofold classification of countries was needed in 
order to, primarily, avoid an unfair situation where (having achieved developed 
status) the ‘intermediate group’ (and not the least developed) would be 
expected to assume obligations right after having lost the right to assistance or 
preferences. Therefore, the initial argument, at least within UNCDP, did not 
seem to point to the creation of a ‘bottom group’ (i.e., the least developed) but, 
instead, to an ‘intermediate group’ (i.e., the more well-off among developing 
countries). 
In parallel, debate on the soon-to-be-created LDC category and related 
benefits were also taking place within UNCTAD. In November 1969, during 
meetings of the Group of Experts on Special Measures in Favour of the Least Developed 
among the Developing Countries16, a report on the subject discussed possible 
classification indicators, “such as the level of per capita income, the relative 
importance of manufacturing activities, per capita consumption of energy or 
steel, the rate of literacy, the size of school enrolment” (UNCTAD, 1969: 2) 
and possible measures to be implemented in their favour. 
In December 1969, a General Assembly resolution17 on “Special measures to 
be taken in favour of the least developed among the developing countries” was adopted and 
the need to “alleviate the problems of the least developed ... with a view to 
enabling them to draw full benefits from the Second United Nations 
Development Decade” (UN, 1969: 37) was formally recognized. Accordingly, 
the General Assembly requested 
a comprehensive examination of the special problems of the least developed 
among the developing countries and ... special measures, within the framework of 
the Second United Nations Development Decade, for dealing with those 
problems (UN, 1969: 37). 
Thus, between May and December 1969 there was a change of hearts or, 
at least, a change of perspective on the part of UNCDP. While in May the 
focus was on introducing an ‘intermediate group’ (going against UNCTAD’s 
ongoing debate on the LDC concept), by December of that same year the 
General Assembly (whose decisions were based on UNCDP’s 
recommendations) had changed its focus to a ‘bottom group’. One cannot help 
but wonder about the reasons behind this change. Considering the context, it 
looks as if this was so as not to lose the momentum of the soon-to-start Second 
Development Decade. Thus, alignment with UNCTAD seems to have been a way 
to reach swift consensus; at least in general and abstract terms. 
During its 6th session in January 1970, while assessing economic growth 
prospects for different country groups, UNCDP used for the first time the 
term ‘least developed’ in its report to the ECOSOC: 
                                                 
16 This Expert Group met from 24 November to 5 December 1969, in Geneva 
(UNCTAD, 1969; Hartshorn, 1969 and UN, 1973). 
17 Resolution 2564 (XXIV) of 13 December 1969 
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For certain countries, especially the least developed among developing countries, there will 
no doubt be great difficulties, since major structural changes will be required, in 
accelerating the rate of growth to desirable levels; and in such cases special 
attention should be given by the world community so as to provide help in order 
to facilitate those changes (UNCDP, 1970: 7, emphasis added). 
The new terminology seemed, therefore, to be entering UN jargon and what is 
so keenly referred to as ‘agreed language’ in diplomatic circles. 
In that same session, UNCDP reaffirmed its conviction regarding the 
need to “refine the two-fold classification of countries as developed and 
developing” (UNCDP, 1970: 19), adding that a study needed to be conducted 
to determine appropriate variables or characteristics for this purpose. More 
importantly, the Committee acknowledged, for the first time, that it had also 
given “some preliminary thought to questions relating to the least developed 
among the developing countries” (UNCDP, 1970: 19), signalling that it now 
recognized the need to prioritize the progress of these countries. With this in 
mind, it constituted a working group of five of its members (UN, 1973: 62) 
(presided by French economist and diplomat, Jean Ripert) that met in March 
of that same year to address issues related to the identification of LDCs. 
In October 1970, the General Assembly finally proclaimed the Second UN 
Development Decade, starting 1 January 1971, and adopted the International 
Development Strategy for the Decade18 - a document that included a section 
on least developed countries. In December 1970, it approved yet another 
resolution19 where it stated the “urgency of identifying the least developed ... 
countries and invited the international organs concerned to give a high priority 
to the question of such identification” (UN, 1970, 64). 
During the 7th session of UNCDP, in March/April 1971, the idea of an 
‘intermediate group’ had apparently dwindled, giving way to the ‘bottom 
group’; the least developed. UNCDP was now very much focused on dealing 
with questions relating to the ‘least developed among developing countries’ 
(UNCDP, 1971: 2). In fact, prior to its 7th session, the working group on LDCs 
presented its deliberations and, for the first time, UNCDP examined their 
special problems “with a view to recommending criteria for identifying those 
countries as well as special measures for dealing with their problems” 
(UNCDP, 1971: 12). UNCDP recognized that 
[w]hile developing countries as a group face more or less the same general 
problems of underdevelopment, the difference between the poorest and the 
relatively more advanced among them is quite substantial. … the capacity of 
these to benefit from general development measures varies widely. The least 
developed among them cannot always be expected to benefit fully or 
automatically from such general measures adopted in favour of all developing 
countries. Some special supplementary measures are therefore called for to remove the 
handicaps which limit the ability of the least developed countries to derive 
significant advantages from the Second United Nations Development Decade 
(UNCDP, 1971: 12, emphasis added). 
With this in mind, the Committee suggested the following three criteria to 
identify LDCs: (i) per capita GDP of US$100 or less, (ii) share of manufacturing 
                                                 
18 http://www.un-documents.net/a25r2626.htm 
19 Resolution 2724 (XXV) of 15 December 1970 
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in total GDP of 10% or less, and (iii) adult literacy rate of 20% or less 
(UNCDP, 1971: 16). The focus was on the economy (instead of nowadays’ 
concern for social factors) and the idea was that governments needed to steer 
it. 
Simplicity in methodology was privileged and to be considered ‘least 
developed’ countries should meet all three criteria. However, exceptions were 
permitted: 
Countries with per capita gross product of $100 or less but with a manufacturing 
ratio or literacy rate somewhat exceeding the limits … should be included, 
especially if their average real rate of growth during recent years has been 
exceptionally low. Similarly, countries where per capita gross product is over $100 
but is not more than around $120 and which satisfy the other criteria should also 
be included. In considering the border-line cases, however, judgment would have 
to be exercised to take account of special circumstances which may have 
distorted the recent picture (UNCDP, 1971: 16, emphasis added). 
Essentially, this reveals that there was considerable room for discretion when 
considering outlier cases. Taking this into consideration, the following 25 
countries were classified as ‘least developed’ in 1971, comprising the original 
LDC list: 
(i) Africa: Botswana, Burundi, Chad, Benin (formerly, Dahomey), 
Ethiopia, Guinea, Lesotho, Mali, Malawi, Niger, Rwanda, Somalia, 
Sudan, Uganda, Tanzania, Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso) 
(ii) Asia and Oceania: Afghanistan, Bhutan, Laos, Maldives, Nepal, 
Sikkim (now integrated into India), Western Samoa, Yemen 
(iii) Latin America: Haiti 
Data for some of these countries (Maldives, Bhutan, Sikkim and Western 
Samoa) were not available but they were still included in the original LDC 
group since the unavailability of statistical data was considered proof of their 
low level of development. Yet, the Committee did recognize the complexity of 
attempting to create a sub-division within the developing countries group, 
stating that  
a two-fold classification of developing countries into “least developed” and 
“other” is somewhat arbitrary, given the multi-dimensional complexity of economic 
and social development. Admittedly, also, there may be different concepts of 
least development, each of which may be especially relevant to a different field of 
action or in the context of a particular region (UNCDP, 1971: 15, emphasis 
added). 
The fact is that special privileges were proposed in favour of these 
countries, namely technical cooperation, financial assistance, and international 
trade and regional cooperation (UNCDP 1971: 21-2). However, and unlike the 
LDC identification criteria, there was very little definition with regard to which 
special privileges would be devised and how they would be provided to those 
countries. Thus, paradoxically, these important details - which were, in fact, the 
core purpose for creating the group in the first place - were left vague. This 
might be explained by the unwillingness of donors to agree to anything too 
concrete and/or by the reluctance of more powerful developing countries to 
truly accept the LDC concept, considering that they themselves would be 
discriminated against. So, this vagueness was indeed in both of their interests 
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given that, because of it, benefits associated with the LDC category could more 
easily become lettre morte. 
It is also interesting to note that the Committee found it necessary to 
include in its report to the ECOSOC the following disclaimer, which, to a 
certain extent, can be seen as indicating the uneasiness with which the creation 
of a division within (the by then well-established group of) developing 
countries was undertaken: 
Although the list must … be regarded as tentative, the Committee nevertheless 
wishes to stress its belief that the list is valid. The Committee believes that by any 
classification criteria the countries included in this list would surely be considered 
as least developed. … the Committee recommends that whatever list of least 
developed countries is adopted for the Second United Nations Development 
Decade, it should be reviewed and, if necessary, revised on the occasion of the 
mid-Decade review. Moreover, the question of identification should be given 
further study within the United Nations system with a view to refining the 
scheme of classifications and the related criteria (UNCDP, 1971: 20) 
This might also reflect disagreements that probably had to be overcome 
during the May-December 1969 period, in order to reach a general consensus. 
In fact, the Committee felt it necessary to recognize that 
the granting of special privileges to the least developed countries may appear to 
discriminate against other developing countries. But, given the peculiar 
conditions of the least developed countries and their consequently limited 
capacity to benefit fully from the general measures for all developing countries, 
failure to accord them these temporary but essential advantages would be 
tantamount to discriminating against them (UNCDP, 1971: 21) 
The proposed LDC identification criteria, as well as the initial list of such 
countries, were recommended to the ECOSOC that, after endorsing those 
recommendations in July 197120, submitted them to the General Assembly for 
final approval. The General Assembly formally approved the list of what it 
considered “hard core least developed countries” (UN, 1971: 52) in 
November 1971, thereby institutionalizing the category. 
With the value of hindsight, Jack Stone - director of UNCTAD Research 
Division when the category was created, subsequently director of UNCTAD 
Special Program for LDCs and known to be “the father of the least developed 
concept” (Weiss, 2005: 237) - summed up the process that gave ‘birth’ to the 
category, which is worth quoting at length: 
There had apparently been resistance from the beginning to efforts to specifically 
identify these countries … the UN Secretariat tried a few initiatives to identify a 
list, but without immediate success. Any specific proposals put forward were at 
best taken note of and sent back for further study. In the early days, the 
opposition to formal identification was mainly from India and some of the large 
Latin American countries, who were afraid specific identification would leave 
them out and divide the Group of 77. … But eventually, … the LDCs and the 
other 77 preached accommodations … in 1971, the mandate was given to the 
Committee for Development Planning (CDP), still under Tinbergen at that time, 
… to attempt to identify a list of the least developed countries … Omprakash 
Talwar … was seized with the problem of making a recommendation to the 
                                                 
20 ECOSOC resolution 1628 (LI) of 30 July 1971 
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committee. He came up with a list of twenty-five least developed countries based 
on three criteria: a very low GNP per head …; a low percentage of 
manufacturing in GNP …; and … a literacy rate below 20 percent. That was the 
starting list. … UNCTAD had an expert group on the least developed countries 
at the time which looked over these proposals and strongly endorsed the list ... 
At last you had an official list of twenty-five countries of what we now abbreviate 
as LDCs (Weiss, 2002: 52-53). 
2.3 Responses to the LDC category 
An obvious question at this juncture is: how did other developing countries, 
specifically the more advanced among them, take this ‘split’ within the 
developing countries group? Evidence suggests that the decision to approve 
the list of 25 ‘hard core’ LDCs was indeed met with considerable opposition 
during the G77 Ministerial Meeting, held in November 1971, in Lima, Peru. 
Opposition came notably from Latin America, a region with only one country 
included in the initial group of LDCs: Haiti. There were (unsuccessful) 
attempts to push for the idea that ‘least development’ should be regarded as a 
relative concept and, hence, considered on a regional, rather than global, basis 
(de Lacharrière, 1971: 471). Latin American countries alleged that, in order to 
determine a list of LDCs, UN Regional Commissions should have been 
consulted, so that regional and sub-regional agreements already in place could 
be duly taken into account (de Lacharrière, 1971: 471). When this failed, there 
were attempts, still without success, to have the General Assembly declare the 
list and the identification criteria provisional (de Lacharrière, 1971: 472). 
Additionally, Jack Stone recalls that the countries who opposed to the 
formal identification of LDCs were also afraid that this would “provide a way 
for the Group B21 countries to shift development support from the other 77 to 
the LDCs” (Weiss, 2002: 52). In the same vein: 
The climate at the time – marked by decolonization and cold war alliances – was 
[considered] inimical to formal distinctions among developing countries. The 
developing country leaders among the Group of 77 feared that the position of 
the group would be weakened in relation to Group B. And the leaders of Group 
B had differing opinions about which developing countries most needed support 
from the international community (Guillaumont, 2009: 19). 
The poorest developing countries were known to have less experienced 
delegations and, as a result, resigned themselves to the eloquence of delegates 
from more advanced developing countries; that pushed harder for their own 
interests. So, to avoid dividing the Third World even more, the poorest are said 
to have postponed their full satisfaction and still collaborated so as to, by not 
greatly upsetting group unity, pull the envisaged reform through (de 
Lacharrière, 1971: 468-469). 
According to Smouts (1981), opting for a limited choice of criteria (and a 
restrictive methodology22) did satisfy developed countries, even though, for 
example, France was pushing for a solution a bit more flexible; one that could 
allow the inclusion on the LDC list of other countries from Francophone 
                                                 
21 i.e., the First World. 
22 In the sense that all three criteria had to be met. 
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Africa and the Indian Ocean. Like all developed countries, however, France 
did not want an unreasonable extension of the list (Smouts, 1981: 52). More 
advanced developing countries, however - having reluctantly accepted the 
concept - were more enthusiastic about the other studies undertaken by 
UNCTAD, which considered multiple criteria and proposed a broader 
definition of the concept of LDC (Smouts, 1981: 52), and would have allowed 
the inclusion of more developing countries in the category. 
Thus, having seen its proposals discarded, UNCTAD, who had been 
instrumental in initiating the issue of ‘least development’ and had participated 
in parallel with UNCDP in the process, initially showed lack of enthusiasm 
towards UNCDP’s proposed list of ‘hard core’ LDCs, selected according to a 
set of criteria different than those it had proposed and using a more restrictive 
approach23. The fact is that 
resolutions at two sittings of the UN Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), in 1972 and 1976, under pressure from the Group of 77, 
systematically referred simultaneously to the LDCs category and the categories of 
land-locked developing countries and small island developing states. Not until 
the fifth UNCTAD, convened in 1979 … was the particularity of the LDCs 
clearly recognized (in resolution 122) (Guillaumont, 2009: 23). 
What is clear is that while donors were striving for criteria that would not 
extend the LDC list too much, developing countries hoped for criteria that 
allowed the creation of a more substantial list of LDCs, guaranteeing that more 
of them would be granted access to additional special measures. When this is 
analyzed in conjunction with the UNCTAD/UNCDP difference of opinion, 
we see that, apparently, while UNCTAD’s proposal protected the position of 
developing countries (by allowing the inclusion of more countries), UNCDP’s 
proposal was more favourable to donors’ interests (by restricting the list). 
Once the concept was generally accepted by all (with different levels of 
enthusiasm), disagreements regarding LDC implementation criteria did not 
only oppose donors and developing countries. Besides dividing the developing 
world, it also divided donors, including two former colonial powers; France 
and Great Britain. Insofar as the selection of LDCs involved a reorientation 
and prioritization of aid flows and trade preferences to those countries, the 
former colonial powers sought to ensure that these flows could continue to be 
directed to groups with which they were traditionally linked to: the 
Commonwealth for the English and French-speaking Africa for the French 
(Smouts, 1981: 53). Hence, serving their own national interests - by 
manipulating the initial list of LDCs - seemed more important than striving for 
a bias-free agreement on LDC identification criteria. Self-interest 
superimposed altruism and the spirit of solidarity and cooperation, 
undermining the attainment of a truly genuine and unadulterated list of LDCs. 
                                                 
23 While the reasons behind this lack of enthusiasm still need a more careful 
investigation, these might rest on the fact that, as the LDC concept progressed from a 
mere idea to the official creation of the category, the process ‘migrated’ from 
UNCTAD to UNCDP. While UNCTAD initiated the process in 1964, by 1971 
UNCDP was the one taking all major decisions. As expected, this might have put 
institutional interests at stake, among them bureaucratic ones. 
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For example, evidence shows that former colonial powers did seek to (by 
‘booby-trapping’ the initial categorization process) ensure that the category 
included countries with which they were already traditionally (and 
commercially) linked to. In fact: 
De toutes les classifications proposées: «pays les plus gravement touchés par la 
crise économique» …, «pays au revenue le plus faible» (utilisée par la Banque 
mondiale), «pays les plus pauvres», etc., la classification des PMA selon les critères du 
Comité de la planification du développement est la plus restrictive et la plus favorable aux Etats 
Africains (Smouts, 1981: 53, emphasis added). 
This realization lends more evidence to the fact that, from donors’ 
perspective, politics and strategic interests were the main (undeclared) drivers 
of the LDC implementation exercise from its inception; notwithstanding its 
narrative based on good intentions and grand development goals, framed 
around the introduction of measures (i.e., normalization) to balance out an 
unequal economic world structure, asymmetrically biased against poor 
countries in general, and the poorest ones in particular. The same argument 
applies for non-LDC developing countries. In fact, Jack Stone recalls that, for 
example, “the Indians … were watching very carefully as to who were included 
in the group. They were happy to keep it small” (Weiss, 2002: 57). 
Some argue that the category is indeed “a political definition to some 
extent, in order to include certain countries and exclude others” (Vienna 
Institute for Development and Cooperation, 1989: 3), corroborating the 
‘manipulation thesis’ referred to earlier 
UNCDP did recognize that, since the initial list excluded large countries, it 
accounted for only “a modest proportion of the population of developing 
countries” (UNCDP 1971: 19), including, as a result, only a minority of the 
poorest people of the developing world. The fact is that the initial ‘hard core’ 
LDCs were, generally speaking, small countries (in terms of population and 
influence) with very little bargaining power at the international level. Even 
today, reinforced by the introduction of a population upper-limit of 75 million 
people in 1991, the LDC category only includes small countries, which, in 
general, tend to assume “the default position of living below the threshold of 
global attention” (Payne, 2004: 623). This means one of three things: (i) 
international recognition that small countries face special problems and, hence, 
need special help; (ii) developed countries’ unwillingness to give preferences to 
countries that really matter, so as to not weaken their own power position; (iii) 
other non-LDC, more advanced developing countries’ interference so that 
special measures would only be provided to countries that could not make 
significant use of them anyway and, with this, not threaten their power 
position. 
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3  Conclusions and avenues for further research 
Limiting the number and type of countries on the list meant limiting the 
responsibility of those expected to provide them with special benefits (i.e., 
donors). The creation of the LDC category - as significant as it might have 
been in demonstrating UN’s readiness to approach the developing countries 
group as a more heterogeneous group, breaking with past policy and modus 
operandi - did not upset the general structure of the world order, nor did it go 
against mainstream development thinking. It was, however, a relevant step 
away from “old ways of framing the international politics of development … 
grounded on a very basic, really rather crude categorization of states” (Payne, 
2001: 6). In particular, it addressed the oversimplification and unrealistic 
homogeneity so intrinsically present in previous analytical models. 
The creation of the category in those specific terms (i.e., non-legally 
binding benefits to be delivered to small and economically and politically 
insignificant countries) was indeed a success from the perspective of both 
donors and more advanced developing countries. It was built off the three 
worlds’ model - which, more than developmental (or even economic), was a 
political approach to world structure - and, thus, it protected the position of 
major world powers (concerned with maintaining as much as possible the status 
quo and protecting economic, political and strategic interests). To them, the 
creation of the LDC category could indeed be supported, but never 
unconditionally nor in detriment of their own interests. Likewise, more 
advanced developing countries could not agree to a category that excluded 
them and included some of their direct competitors and, hence, settled for an 
all-in-all harmless deal, which would not significantly jeopardize their interests. 
Having the category set up in those specific terms seems to have been the best 
of all evils. Apparently, it was either that way or no way at all. 
Thus, to a certain extent, the creation of the LDC category as proposed by 
UNCDP did move conventional wisdom further, since, in a way, it successfully 
addressed, even if unintentionally, criticism regarding the unrealistic Third 
World homogeneity, according to which countries were lumped together and 
treated indiscriminately. Furthermore, it might have been a move to (try to) do 
away with the political connotation in which the concept of the Third World 
was so tightly wrapped around. By making inclusion into the LDC category 
dependent on a set of technically-constructed indicators that only addressed 
quantifiable factors, the process of gaining LDC status became - at least 
apparently and, most certainly, in its narrative - essentially mechanical and 
rules-based, as opposed to political, arbitrary and power-dependent (e.g., 
moved exclusively by donors’ interests) and, therefore, less open to discussion 
than otherwise. 
So, what was the motivation behind the UN decision to establish the LDC category? 
Implicitly, LDC discourse points to normalization of international assistance 
(i.e., provision of a norm for the allocation of this assistance - being it in the 
area of trade or aid; both extremely permissible to donors’ national motivations 
and, hence, susceptible to function mainly as foreign policy instruments). This 
means that by building an understanding around the idea that international 
assistance should be primarily directed to those classified as LDCs, the UN 
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expected to reduce the political nature (or the unpredictability) of donors’ 
development policy decisions and, with this, guarantee a successful Second 
Development Decade. However, the implementation of this understanding was 
compromised by both donors’ and other non-LDC developing countries’ lack 
of altruism. This generated a category of small and economically and politically 
insignificant countries. Thus, in terms of analytical approaches, while the LDC 
project as envisaged by the UN fits into a global 
society/interdependence/cooperation narrative and discourse, its 
implementation happened in the real world of international political economy 
where (the constant quest for) power dictates behaviours. 
The establishment of the LDC category represented an important step 
towards greater recognition of the plight of the most disadvantaged countries 
and the need to treat them differently and more favourably. Indeed the idea 
behind the category did represent a significant advance in that direction. 
However, its operationalisation has not allowed the category to live up to its 
main philosophy as indicated by the extremely low number of graduation 
cases. Clearly, without the fulfilment of its political foundation, the LDC 
category remains an unrealized exercise; nowadays rooted, essentially, in efforts 
to keep alive the considerable bureaucracy that over the years has become 
associated to it. 
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